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Crypto Crime

Twenty minutes to steal, forty-five days to wash

North Korea-linked hackers took at least $2.02bn in crypto in 2025 and, with the Binance theft, at least $7bn so far in 2026. The method repeats: a human way in, a drain in minutes, then weeks of swaps, bridges and brokers.

Marcus Oyelaran · House byline
November 1, 20265 min read
Lines of tall wire fencing running down a green hillside towards forested mountains under a hazy skyFriar's Balsam, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons
Fences along the Korean Demilitarized Zone, seen from the Eulji Observatory in South Korea, in a file photograph.Photograph via Wikimedia Commons

North Korea-linked hackers stole at least $2.02bn in crypto in 2025, a record and 51 per cent more than in 2024, according to Chainalysis, and by our arithmetic at least $7bn so far in 2026, most of it in a single theft from Binance. The thefts follow a pattern that analytics firms and the FBI have now documented many times over.

The pattern has three stages. First comes a way in, usually through people or suppliers rather than a flaw in the code. Then the funds are drained in minutes. Then comes the slow part: weeks or months of converting, splitting and moving the proceeds until they can be sold for cash. The second and third stages leave a record on public blockchains, which is why so much of the process can be described in detail.

Who is doing it? The US government's 2022 advisory on the group it calls TraderTraitor says the industry tracks it as "Lazarus Group, APT38, BlueNoroff, and Stardust Chollima", according to CISA. The names are not interchangeable in every vendor's usage. TRM Labs, a blockchain analytics firm, attributes Binance and KelpDAO to TraderTraitor but says April's Drift theft was the work of a separate North Korean group.

VictimWhenAmount reportedAttributed toWay in, as reported
Binance (exchange)29 Oct 2026$6.36bnTraderTraitor (TRM Labs, "high confidence")Binance points to a compromised engineer's laptop; TRM says that does not explain everything
Bybit (exchange)21 Feb 2025$1.46bn (Elliptic); about $1.5bn (FBI)TraderTraitor (FBI)A compromised Safe{Wallet} signing interface (TRM)
Ronin bridge (Axie Infinity)March 2022About $540m at the time; over $615m at discoveryLazarus Group (US Treasury, via Elliptic)Keys to five of nine validators, socially engineered
DMM Bitcoin (exchange, Japan)May 2024$308m (about ¥48.2bn)TraderTraitor (FBI, DC3 and Japan's National Police Agency)Not described in the notice we read
KelpDAO (restaking protocol)18 Apr 2026$292mTraderTraitor (TRM)Two internal RPC nodes poisoned, a single bridge verifier fooled
Drift (derivatives exchange)1 Apr 2026$285mA North Korean group distinct from TraderTraitor (TRM)Months of social engineering, including in-person meetings, and pre-signed transactions
Compiled by Komposite from TRM Labs, TRM Labs, Elliptic, the FBI, Elliptic and Japan's National Police Agency. Amounts are as each source valued them at the time and are not adjusted.

How do they get in? The recruiter lure is the oldest route. CISA described spear-phishing messages offering "high-paying jobs" to system administrators and DevOps staff, which led them to download trojanised trading apps. Chainalysis says the approach has widened to fake hiring processes with "technical screens" for web3 and AI firms, and to approaches posing as investors or acquirers. North Korean IT workers hired under false identities are a third route: the FBI has warned that they have used AI and face-swapping in video interviews, copied company code to personal accounts and held stolen data for ransom, in a January 2025 notice. The fourth is the supply chain. Bybit's $1.46bn was taken through a compromised Safe{Wallet} signing interface, TRM says, and KelpDAO's through two of its own poisoned RPC nodes, the servers that relay blockchain data.

The drain itself is fast. TRM counts $6.36bn moved out of Binance wallets on ten blockchains, most of it in about 20 minutes, in its analysis of the theft. Drift lost $285m in about 12 minutes through transactions its own signers had been induced to pre-authorise, TRM said in April. Komposite reported the Binance theft on Friday and does not retell it here.

The first move after a theft is to swap anything that can be frozen for something that cannot. At Bybit, staked ether tokens were swapped for ether on decentralised exchanges within minutes and spread across 50 wallets of about 10,000 ETH each, Elliptic reported. At Binance, TRM says the attacker sold about 325m USDT, a dollar stablecoin its issuer can freeze, for about 122,300 ether at a discount of more than 10 per cent, and borrowed ether against stolen stablecoins on lending protocols. It also split 18,270 bitcoin into pieces of 1,000 and 100 coins.

Then comes chain hopping. Most of Bybit's ether was converted into bitcoin, much of it through THORChain, a cross-chain swap protocol, according to TRM, and through eXch, a swap service that refused Bybit's requests to block the flows, according to Elliptic. The bitcoin then went through mixers. The FBI's notice on Bybit asked node operators, exchanges, bridges and decentralised finance services to block the addresses involved. Compared with other thieves, North Korean groups use bridges 97 per cent more and mixers 100 per cent more, Chainalysis found, and send more than 60 per cent of their volume in transfers of less than $500,000.

The last stage is cash. Chainalysis identifies Chinese-language money movement and guarantee services as the most distinctive feature of North Korean laundering, and describes a pattern of about 45 days after a large theft: mixing and decentralised finance in the first five days, exchanges with limited identity checks next, and conversion through no-KYC exchanges, guarantee services and Chinese-language laundering networks from about day 20. For Binance, TRM expects bridges, swap services and over-the-counter brokers next. Some funds wait: TRM said in April that the ether taken from Drift had not moved.

YearStolen by North Korea-linked hackersShare of all crypto hack losses
2024About $1.34bn (by our subtraction from Chainalysis)39 per cent (TRM)
2025At least $2.02bn (Chainalysis); Bybit was 72 to 74 per cent of it, by our arithmetic59 per cent by our arithmetic on Chainalysis's totals; 64 per cent (TRM)
2026, first halfAbout $643m (TRM)About 66 per cent (TRM)
2026, with BinanceAt least $7.0bn, by our arithmeticNot yet published
Sources: Chainalysis, TRM Labs and TRM Labs. The 2026 total adds TRM's first-half figure to its Binance count and leaves out any other second-half incidents, so it is a floor.

What do the totals show? Fewer, larger thefts. Chainalysis counted 74 per cent fewer known North Korean attacks in 2025 than in 2024 while the value stolen rose. By our arithmetic, the Bybit theft alone was 72 to 74 per cent of North Korea's 2025 haul, and Binance is 3.1 times that whole year. The sources differ on share: on Chainalysis's figures North Korea took about 59 per cent of the more than $3.4bn stolen in 2025, while TRM puts its share at 64 per cent. TRM's figures for the first half of 2026, $643m of $972m across 207 hacks, published in July, predate Binance, which is why earlier tallies for this year look small.

Why it matters: the weak point is rarely the cryptography. In every theft in our table whose way in has been described, the attackers went through people, suppliers or the infrastructure around the code, and the money then left through services willing to swap, bridge or broker it. The analytics firms that trace these flows are themselves targets: Chainalysis, which helps trace the Binance funds, disclosed an intrusion of its own on Friday. Hacken found that most third-quarter hack losses came from systems outside the audit, which is where North Korea has been working for years.

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