Eleven hours on someone else's shelf
A tampered copy of Anthropic's Claude Code extension was served from Cursor's marketplace for about 11 hours on 29 October. It tried to plant an SSH backdoor. Cursor has not said how the attacker got publishing access.
Sai Kiran Anagani, CC0, via Wikimedia CommonsA tampered copy of Anthropic's Claude Code extension was available on Cursor's extension marketplace for about 11 hours on 29 October and tried to install a hidden SSH backdoor on developers' machines, Cursor said in a security notice. Versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 for macOS and Windows were affected. Cursor said the builds "were not developed by Anthropic".
Cursor is an AI code editor built on Microsoft's open-source VS Code, and it runs its own marketplace for the extensions its users install. Claude Code, Anthropic's coding agent, is offered there as an extension. The malicious builds were live from about 2:27am to 1:35pm Pacific time, Cursor said. Cursor removed them on detection, audited access, rotated its keys, rebuilt the marketplace and brought it back online, and it worked with the hosting provider to take the attacker's server offline. It said it found no other tampered extensions. Its notice does not say how many people installed the builds, or how the attacker obtained the access to publish them.
What did the code do? A loader added to the top of the extension's main file ran as soon as the extension loaded, BleepingComputer reported, citing the researchers at Phorion and OpenSourceMalware who found it. According to a static analysis by StepSecurity, it added an attacker's key named "svc-telemetry" to the machine's list of authorised SSH keys, tried to switch on the SSH server, and every 60 seconds tried to open a reverse tunnel to a server at 134.209.82.225. It set itself to survive a restart through a LaunchAgent on macOS and a scheduled task or startup script on Windows. It also sent the machine's name, user name, Git email address and the names, but not the values, of up to 40 environment variables that looked like credentials.
| When (UTC) | What happened | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 29 Oct, about 09:27 | Tampered builds 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 appear on Cursor's extension marketplace for macOS and Windows | Cursor; StepSecurity |
| 29 Oct, 20:35 | Cursor removes the builds, takes the marketplace offline and rotates keys | Cursor; StepSecurity |
| 30 Oct | The attacker's server is taken offline with the hosting provider; Cursor updates its indicators and the affected versions | Cursor |
| 30 Oct | Early claims that npm, Open VSX and Microsoft's marketplace were hit are ruled out; Cursor was the only source | BleepingComputer; StepSecurity |
| 1 Nov | StepSecurity publishes a static analysis of the recovered extension code | StepSecurity |
How far did it get? Less far than it tried. Cursor said the step that switches on SSH "would fail" outside highly unusual circumstances, but that the extension still added the key, installed its persistence and sent host details. BleepingComputer traced the failures to coding errors: on macOS the remote-login check needs administrator rights it did not have, and on Windows the setup ran through a Unix shell that standard Windows machines do not have. StepSecurity found no second-stage download and no access to Claude or editor data, and stressed that installing an affected version does not by itself prove a machine was compromised.
The numbers are thinner than the coverage. Up to 5,000 users may have been exposed, heise reported, citing Reuters, and BleepingComputer and StepSecurity both describe that as Cursor's initial upper bound. Cursor's own notice gives no figure. Early reports also said the tampered build had reached npm, the Open VSX registry and Microsoft's marketplace. That was ruled out: Cursor was the only distribution point, and StepSecurity verified the 2.1.312 build on Open VSX as clean.
Anthropic says its own systems were not breached. Felix Rieseberg of Anthropic said "it wasn't a compromise of Anthropic's systems or employee laptops", and that the versions on its official channels were unaffected, StepSecurity recorded. David Dworken of Anthropic confirmed that 2.1.313 was never published to Open VSX, Microsoft's marketplace or its other official hosts, and the company moved straight to version 2.1.314, which users should now be on. Cursor's advice for anyone who installed during the window is to look for the svc-telemetry key, remove the persistence and tunnel processes, and rotate credentials from a trusted machine. "Uninstalling the extension may not be sufficient," it said.
Why it matters: a developer's machine holds the keys to everything else, and an extension runs with the developer's rights. Here the publisher's code was clean and its official channels were untouched; the weak point was a third-party store that redistributes its work, and that store has not yet explained how it was used. Cursor has had other security questions in recent days: researchers said last week that browsers built into five AI coding tools, Cursor's among them, broke basic security rules; Cursor's has since been fixed. Railway's customers were told this month to rotate every key after an unauthorised party may have decrypted some of their environment variables, the same class of material a reverse tunnel into a developer's laptop could reach.